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Abstract 
We describe a guilt-by-association system that can be used 
to rank entities by their suspiciousness.  We demonstrate 
the algorithm on a suite of data sets generated by a terrorist-
world simulator developed under a DoD program. The data 
sets consist of thousands of people and some known links 
between them.  We show that the system ranks truly mali-
cious individuals highly, even if only relatively few are 
known to be malicious ex ante. When used as a tool for 
identifying promising data-gathering opportunities, the sys-
tem focuses on gathering more information about the most 
suspicious people and thereby increases the density of link-
age in appropriate parts of the network.  We assess per-
formance under conditions of noisy prior knowledge (score 
quality varies by data set under moderate noise), and 
whether augmenting the network with prior scores based on 
profiling information improves the scoring (it doesn’t).  Al-
though the level of performance reported here would not 
support direct action on all data sets, it does recommend the 
consideration of network-scoring techniques as a new 
source of evidence in decision making.  For example, the 
system can operate on networks far larger and more com-
plex than could be processed by a human analyst. 
1. Introduction 
This paper studies suspicion scoring: ranking individuals 
by their estimated likelihood of being malicious.  In par-
ticular, we address suspicion scoring in networks of peo-
ple, linked by communications, meetings, or other asso-
ciations (e.g., being in the same vicinity at the same 
time). Our system makes use of the simple-yet-ubiquitous 
principle of homophily [Blau 1977; McPherson et al. 
2001]; social research has shown repeatedly that a person 
is more likely to associate with people who share similar 
interests or characteristics.  Homophily is the basis of a 
simple guilt-by-association algorithm: estimate suspicion 
level by counting malicious associates. 
Suspicion scoring based on networked data has been 
used successfully, although typically in an ad hoc man-
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ner, for fraud detection.  The “dialed digits” monitors 
discussed by Fawcett and Provost score an account 
highly if it calls the same numbers called by known 
fraudulent accounts [Fawcett and Provost 1997]; the 
“communities of interest” of Cortes et al. explicitly rep-
resent the network neighborhoods around telephone ac-
counts as a basis for suspicion scoring [Cortes et al. 
2001].  We extend such methods by propagating suspi-
cion through the association network, and conducting 
suspicion-based acquisition of additional data. 
One problem with using the simple homophily-based 
guilt-by-association algorithm in large networks is that 
few people may be known to be malicious.  Often none 
of an individual’s associates are known to be either mali-
cious or benign.  However, if the association graph is 
well connected, then following linkages of associations is 
likely eventually to lead to at least one individual who is 
known or strongly suspected to be malicious.  Based on 
this idea, we overcome the problem of sparse knowledge 
by propagating suspicion scores through the association 
network until all suspicion scores stabilize.  In particular, 
we use an adaptation of the relaxation labeling method 
shown to yield good performance for hypertext classifi-
cation by Chakrabarti et al. [1998].2   
Relaxation labeling works well if the association graph 
is well-connected.  For intelligence data, one must con-
sider the difference between the true association network 
and the network of known associations.  The association 
network may be known only partially.  We address this 
via suspicion-based data acquisition, using current suspi-
cion scores to acquire additional connections to improve 
the suspicion propagation.  In a realistic setting, acquir-
ing association links (involving subpoenas for transaction 
records, surveillance, interviews, phone taps, etc.) is 
costly in terms of money, resources, legal issues, and 
public perception.  We attempt to minimize costs by ac-
quiring such “secondary data” only for the people with 
the highest estimated suspiciousness.  This heuristic 
works well in the data we have studied.   
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1) A relational classifier which generates a suspicion score for a particular individual, pi, given the known asso-
ciations of pi and the strengths of those association links.  
2) A collective inference technique to propagate scores throughout the network. 
3) An adaptive technique for acquiring data to increase the density of connections in the network. 
Table 1: Guilt-by-association main components. 
 
1) Acquire information on all people initially known to be malicious. 
2) Generate suspicion scores for all individuals with unknown scores. 
3) Get information on the top k individuals not yet queried (k = 50 for this paper). 
4) Generate new suspicion scores. 
5) Repeat steps 3 and 4 until some stopping criterion is met (in this paper: either when all individuals in the data 
set have been queried against or when we reach the 25th iteration.) 
Table 2: Data Acquisition algorithm. 
 
2. Guilt-by-association, Collective infer-
ence, and data acquisition 
Our scoring algorithm consists of three main components 
listed in Table 1. The first two components are part of a 
network learning toolkit called NetKit-SRL [Macskassy 
& Provost. 2004].  This open-source toolkit, written in 
Java 1.5, is publicly available and contains methods for 
learning patterns more complicated than simple guilt-by-
association. The third component is a data acquisition 
wrapper which uses this toolkit in its inner loop. 
2.1 Relational Class ifier 
The relational classifier used in the study is a simple “re-
lational neighbor” model, based on the principle of ho-
mophily and a first-order Markov assumption [Macskassy 
and Provost 2003, 2004].  The model estimates suspicion 
as the weighted sum of the suspicions of the immediate 
neighbors in the association network.  Specifically, the 
score of person i is: 
 
 
 
where Ni is the set of known associates of person pi and 
wi ,j is the strength of the association between persons i 
and j—in our application defined as the number of times 
pi and pj have been known to interact.  The score, s(pj), is 
the current suspicion score of person pj  (note the similar-
ity of our method, paired with the updating method de-
scribed below, to Hopfield Networks [Hopfield 1982] 
and Boltzmann machines [Ackley et al. 1985]).  For peo-
ple whose status is known (good or bad), this is static—
viz., 1 for ‘bad’ and 0 for ‘good’.  Z is the sum of 
weights wi,j, to keep all scores between 0 and 1. 
2.2 Collect ive Inference 
When only a few malicious individuals are known, there 
will be neighbors who (initially) have no value for s(pj).  
To deal with this scenario, first recognize that if we had 
estimates of the unknown scores, then we could apply the 
relational classifier to estimate s(pi).  Second, the scores 
of pi and pj are clearly interrelated and estimating one 
will have an influence the other.  We therefore estimate 
all unknown scores simultaneously or “collectively” 
[Jensen et al., 2004].  As it is not tractable to perform 
exact inference to estimate the full joint probability dis-
tribution over a large network, we use an approximation 
technique.  In particular, we use an adaptation of relaxa-
tion labeling, based on the work of Chakrabarti et al. 
[1998].  Relaxation labeling “freezes” the current esti-
mated scores and then updates all estimates pseudo-
simultaneously to generate new estimates.  It does so 
repeatedly until the estimates converge.  Unfortunately, 
this often leads to oscillation between two distinct sets of 
world-estimates.  Therefore, we apply simulated anneal-
ing to enforce convergence.  More formally: 
 
 
 
 
where t is the iteration step and α(t) the temperature, with 
)0(α  = c 
)1( +tα  = β * )(tα , 
where c is a starting constant and β is a decay constant.  
We use the values 1 and 0.99 for c and β, respectively, 
and stop after 100 iterations. 
Relaxation labeling and other collective inference 
techniques require initial estimates to bootstrap the infer-
ence.  We initialize scores to 1 for initially “known” ma-
licious people (and freeze them) and 0.01 for the rest.  If 
we had had knowledge of benign people, we would have 
initialized those scores to 0. 
2.3 Data Acquis it ion 
As discussed above, it may be possible (at a cost) to aug-
ment the association network incrementally.  The strategy 
used in this paper is shown in Table 2, which acquires 
additional information (associations and possibly 
unknown associates) about the most suspicious people. 
3. Case Study 
Using simulated data, we evaluate whether this method 
can produce accurate rankings of individuals by suspi-
cion scoring.  Specifically: are the highest-scoring indi-
viduals predominantly malicious? Our study is fourfold, 
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Data set True size Number bad Initial size  True bad  False bad Noise 
5046 13236 1484 4212 143 52 0.267 
5048 13756 2173 9601 226 0 0 
5049 988 269 766 62 0 0 
5050 1008 316 439 103 336 0.765 
5052 986 278 292 82 210 0.719 
5053 1002 274 332 116 216 0.651 
5056 1022 300 317 99 218 0.688 
5062 9897 2852 3745 500 0 0 
5063 9998 2823 4825 828 276 0.25 
5065 16046 7574 5907 1264 82 0.061 
5066 16743 8002 5332 1284 173 0.119 
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Synthetic Data sets. True size refers to the number of individuals in the true synthetic world and Number 
bad refers to the total number of truly malicious individuals. Initial size refers to the number of individuals included in the primary data; 
True bad refers the number of individuals tagged as ‘bad’ who truly were bad in the world and the False bad refers to the number of indi-
viduals falsely tagged as ‘bad’.  The error rate (Noise) of these labelings ranges from none (0) to very high as seen in the 505x data sets.  
Note that step 1 in Table 2 above must query the secondary database for information on all ‘false bad’ as well as all ‘true bad’ individuals. 
 
assessing: (1) the initial rankings; (2) the improvement as 
we acquire more information, (3) how good the initial 
knowledge of maliciousness must be (i.e., how much 
noise can be tolerated), and (4) whether adding profiling-
based initial scores improves the final scoring. 
3.1.  Data 
There are many varieties of intelligence data—no single 
comparison of classified and synthetic data will be com-
prehensive. The data we use for this paper were gener-
ated by a flexible simulator as part of a DoD program to 
assess the feasibility of large-scale information systems 
to help identify terrorists.  The synthetic data generated 
by this simulator are moderately sized examples of struc-
tured data representing terrorists and benign entities who 
are conducting activities over an extended period of time. 
The data are contained wholly in a single data source and 
are self-consistent, neither of which is reliably true of 
classified data. However, the data do replicate a range of 
noisy and poorly observed activities, and the entities are 
intentionally obscured to simulate lack of knowledge, 
obfuscation, poor data-entry practices, multiple identi-
ties, etc. Nonetheless, we do not claim that the data fully 
replicate the limitations of actual data collection, aggre-
gation and enrichment that the intelligence community 
routinely experiences. We use data sets generated for the 
purposes of DoD program evaluation.  We do not create 
data sets ourselves for this paper. 
One run of the simulator generates three databases: 
1) “primary” data that are known ex ante.  These of-
ten are sparse and may contain partial (or no) in-
formation on any particular individual or group; 
2) “secondary” data consisting of information which 
can only be acquired by querying (theoretically at a 
cost) to get information on a particular individual; 
3) “truth” data, for evaluation, consisting of what 
really happened in the world. 
The first two databases together reflect what possibly can 
be observed.  They are potentially corrupt and contain 
only a subset of the complete truth.  Further, the data 
never give hard evidence that an individual is benign, and 
therefore we only “know” about some malicious indi-
viduals—those who are known to belong to one or more 
terrorist groups.  Sometimes this knowledge is wrong. 
We evaluate the suspicion scoring on eleven data sets, 
whose characteristics are shown in Table 3. 
3.2 Results 
We evaluate the suspicion scoring using the Area Under 
the ROC Curve (AUC), which is equivalent to the Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon statistic and computes the probability 
that a randomly selected malicious person would be 
given a higher suspicion score than a randomly selected 
benign person.  Therefore, an AUC of 0.5 means that a 
scoring is no better than random guessing (the ranking is 
well shuffled); a value of 1 indicates a perfect ranking—
all the malicious people get higher scores than all the 
benign people.  Since we cannot generate scores for un-
seen individuals or for individuals with no known asso-
ciations, these are not considered when calculating the 
AUC.  In order to address how noise affects performance, 
we group the data sets into three categories: no noise 
(5048, 5049, 5062), low to moderate noise (5046, 5063, 
5065, 5066), and very high noise (5050, 5052, 5053, 
5056). 
Figures 1(a)-(c) show, for each category, how the sys-
tem performed throughout its data acquisition run.  Itera-
tion 1 represents using only initially known data and it-
eration 2 is the performance after querying all individuals 
whose suspicion score was known initially.  Figure 1(a) 
shows a wide range of performances from almost perfect 
(5049) to just below AUC=0.8 (5048).  In all three cases, 
we see that performance increases as we gather more 
data.  We also see that guilt-by-association is able to per-
form much better than random ranking (AUC = 0.5). 
Figure 1(b) shows the performance of the suspicion 
scores on the moderate-noise data sets.  As we can see, 
using only primary data generally results in performance 
no better than random.  However, as we query the secon- 
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Figure 1: AUCs using active data acquisition.  
 
 
Figure 2: Ranking of bad guys after each iteration of data acquisition on data set 5046 (moderate noise).  Iteration 1 corresponds to using 
initially known data, and iteration 2 is after querying on all individuals with known suspicion scores.  A red dot represents the rank of one 
true bad guy, where lower rank means having a higher score.  Red dots at the far left correspond to bad guys in the top-ranks.  The figure 
shows how many individuals have been seen with respect to the true world (purple diamond) as well as how many of those have known 
interactions with other people (blue cross). 
 
dary data the performance quickly improves to achieve 
AUC values around 0.8.  It is noteworthy that the system 
overcomes the initial noisy labels, showing that it is ro-
bust to even moderate noise where 1 out of 4 people were 
mistakenly judged to be malicious.  This is because 
“bad” people in these data communicate just as much as 
“good” people, but to far fewer people. Hence their asso-
ciative strength to other “bad” people is much stronger. 
Figure 1(c) shows the performance of the suspicion 
scoring on the high-noise data. In this case, more than 
half of the individuals tagged as “bad” are actually 
“good”.  Even the scores that start off well deteriorate 
quickly, and all end up with ranking much worse than 
random (note the different vertical scale), because the 
algorithm is actually propagating knowledge of good-
ness; were we simply to flip the scores, then the system 
would perform quite well in 3 of the 4 cases! 
Figure 1 only tells part of the story.  For an analyst, 
knowing that the system can achieve an AUC of 0.8 does 
not necessarily mean that the system is useful.  Although 
the system, in general, will rank suspicious people 
higher, when considering 10000 people, the top 100 
could potentially be primarily good with the next 900 
being primarily bad.  Albeit unusual, this would achieve 
a relatively high AUC, but not be very useful for analysts 
who only have time to look at a select few individuals. 
Usually for rankings such as suspicion scorings, the 
density of entities of interest is highest at the very top of 
the list, especially if the scores are estimated probabili-
ties of membership in a class (e.g., malicious individual), 
and so the top of the list contains the individuals with the 
highest estimated probabilities. For a given AUC value, 
how dense one expects the top of a ranking to be depends 
primarily on the marginal probability of entities of inter-
est in the data (this and related issues are treated in detail 
elsewhere [Provost and Fawcett, 2001]).  An AUC of 0.8 
may have 99 truly malicious individuals in the top 100 
highest-suspicion individuals, or it may have 10.  In ei-
ther case, the system may be useful to an analyst, de-
pending on the application and how the ranking will be 
  Data Iteration 
1 
Iteration 
2 
Last 
Iteration 
5048 86 98 100 
5049 59 78 100 
No  
Noise 
5062 100 96 100 
5046 21 51 99 
5063 56 42 34 
5065 93 80 84 
 
Moderate 
Noise 
5066 55 77 84 
5050 23 44 5 
5052 32 45 1 
5053 21 46 4 
 
Large 
Noise 
5056 22 36 18 
 
Table 4: How many truly bad people were in the top 100 
after iteration 1 (using only “primary” data), iteration 2 (af-
ter querying individuals “known” to be malicious), and after 
the last iteration. 
 
used (e.g., as a primary basis for action versus as an al-
ternative source of evidence to augment existing prac-
tices). 
To illustrate the effectiveness of the scorings for these 
data sets for a particular threshold, we analyze the num-
ber of truly malicious individual at the top of the suspi-
cion rankings.  Figure 2 shows a plot of data set 5046 
(13236 people, 1484 of them being truly malicious, mod-
erate noise), where each line in the graph represents one 
iteration of the data acquisition, and each (red) dot repre-
sents a malicious individual in the ranking.  
Figure 2 shows qualitatively what is happening after 
each iteration, where the “malicious” people clearly are 
being ranked higher and higher as a group.  If we look 
across the 11 data sets, we can ask how many truly mali-
cious people are among the top 100 most suspicious.  We 
focus on three points of interest: initial data before any 
acquisition (Iteration 1), performance after querying all 
individuals “known” to be malicious (Iteration 2), and 
after the data acquisition is done (Last iteration).  Table 4 
shows the results for the 11 data sets, grouped by their 
noise level. Table 4 shows quantitatively what Figure 1 
was telling us: In the no-noise group, we get very good 
rankings even using only primary data, where the in-
creasing AUC score reflects what happens below the top 
100.  The moderate noise group shows mixed results, 
where 2 of the data sets (5046 and 5066) greatly increase 
the density of malicious individuals whereas 5065 is rela-
tively stable and 5063 shows a decrease.  Again, the lift 
in AUC values reflects what happens below the top 100.  
Finally, we see in the very large noise group that by the 
final iteration the system has almost no malicious indi-
viduals in the top 100.  Again, remember that the abso-
lute numbers (e.g., “precision” of 84 out of 100) reflect 
the marginal probability of being malicious in a particu-
lar data set; the ROC curve is independent of this prob-
ability, which is one reason why 5063 and 5046, although 
having very similar ranking ability (AUC) have very dif-
ferent precision for a fixed threshold [Provost and Faw-
cett, 2001]. 
3.3 Adding profil ing information 
For the results presented so far, we have assumed that the 
only information available ex ante is the set of possibly 
noisy labels for a subset of the nodes in the network.  The 
suspicion scores were determined solely by the quality of 
these labels and the structure of the association network.  
However, additional information may be available for 
suspicion scoring.  There may be suspicion models based 
on characteristics of individuals, or other less-certain 
prior knowledge.  Such additional knowledge can aug-
ment the guilt-by-association suspicion scoring in several 
ways.  The most straightforward is to use it to set the 
prior suspicion scores for the network. We model such 
additional knowledge simply by conditional score distri-
butions, e.g., one for truly malicious individuals and one 
for benign individuals.  Under such a framework, the 
prior scenario corresponds to: a uniform distribution 
(score=1) for the “known” individuals and a uniform un-
conditional distribution (score=0.01) for the rest.  Statis-
tical profiling of individuals based on their characteristics 
could be modeled as a pair of class-conditional distribu-
tions, benign versus malicious.  Profiling is effective to 
the extent that the class-conditional distributions are 
separated.  
It is intuitive that augmenting a network with very 
high-quality knowledge should improve suspicion scor-
ing. However, it is not clear whether adding lower-
quality knowledge should improve the scores, or whether 
the propagation of the "known labels" is sufficient.  We 
augmented the simulated domains by adding profiling 
scores based on separated class-conditional distributions.  
Specifically, we generated scores for truly malicious (be-
nign) individuals by randomly sampling from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.55 (0.45) and standard de-
viation of 0.25.  This resulted in a slight, but not notice-
able, improvement in three of the 11 data sets (5046, 
5048 and 5062).  In none of the cases did the priors hurt 
performance. Increasing the separation and decreasing 
the standard deviation increased the improvement for 
those three data sets and surprisingly had no discernable 
difference for the remaining 8.  Figure 3 shows the most 
noticeable improvements when using distributions with 
means 0.9 (malicious) and 0.1 (benign) and a standard 
deviation of 0.05 (essentially perfect separation). 
We examined the data sets to investigate whether any 
characteristics explain why the augmented priors helped 
in only 3 of the 11 data sets.  The only seemingly ex-
planatory factor was the fraction of “known” individuals.  
The three data sets where the augmented priors helped 
were also the three data sets that had the smallest ratio of 
known individuals to total individuals.  Further investiga-
tion reveals that even perfect initial profiling scores get 
“washed out” by the static labels and their propagation 
through the network.  In some sense, having only few 
labels “helped” in that the initial priors were not entirely 
dominated by the known labels.  This is an important 
limitation which requires further research. 
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Figure 3: Improvements in performance when augment-
ing prior-scores by randomly drawing from very well 
separated class-conditional distributions. 
4. Other limitations and issues 
The system we described here has other notable limita-
tions.  First, it relies on the network and will therefore 
suffer greatly if there is not enough associative informa-
tion in the graph.  Second, while it can be relatively ro-
bust to moderate noise, it can perform poorly if the initial 
knowledge is bad. Third, as just mentioned, we found 
that the static labels and the network structure would 
dominate the final scores to the point where initial priors 
had no effect.  We need to understand better how profil-
ing scores can help the overall performance.  This is an 
issue that is likely to impact many collective inference 
techniques and needs to receive more attention. 
5. Final Remarks 
We described and evaluated a guilt-by-association system 
for generating suspicion scores based on entities’ known 
associates.  The system is notable for several reasons.  
First, it is able to generate remarkably good rankings 
even when very few individuals have known suspicion 
scores.  Second, it can be relatively robust even to mod-
erate noise in initial scores.  Third, it works remarkably 
well considering that it only uses suspicion scores and 
the network, but no profiling.  Finally, it can be used as a 
data gathering tool not only to perform focused data ac-
quisition of suspicious people, but also to further im-
prove its ranking—and in the process often learn/acquire 
data about suspicious people that were not initially in the 
database. 
We evaluated this system on a range of data sets, vary-
ing in both size and noise level.  We saw that the system 
was robust to moderate noise but failed when the major-
ity of the initial scores were wrong.  We further showed 
that it was possible to improve rankings by using a fo-
cused data acquisition technique, sometimes being able to 
achieve almost perfect separation between malicious and 
benign people in the network. 
Lastly, we did a preliminary investigation into aug-
menting the scoring with other uncertain-but-better-than-
random knowledge (as from a profiling system).  We 
found that priors had little-to-no effect due to the domi-
nance of the scores propagated from the static labels.  
This is a problem which can have an impact on many 
collective inference techniques.  An important open ques-
tion is how one should combine relational and local in-
formation properly such that one does not dominate the 
other. 
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